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We prove that if our calculating capability is limited to that of a
universal Turing machine with a finite tape, then Church’s thesis is
true. This way we accomplish Post (1936) program.
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§1 Church’s Thesis
¶1 · Church’s thesis, also known as Church-Turing thesis, says, see Gandy (1980):
⋄ Thesis 1 What is effectively calculable is computable.
¶2 · What is computable is anything that any Turing machine can compute, where the
Turing machine was defined by Turing (1936). There are other definitions of computable,
using for example Church’s λ-calculus, but all of them are mathematically equivalent. In
any case, the term computable is defined with mathematical rigor.
¶3 · But, because what can be calculated was considered a vague notion, it was assumed
that Church’s thesis could not be formally proven. In what follows, we will make some
definitions and assumptions in order to overcome the ambiguity. Then we will deduce
Church’s thesis from our calculating limitations, which we will assume are those of a
universal Turing machine with a finite tape. In doing so, we are realizing the old program
of Post (1936), for whom Church’s thesis is not a definition nor an axiom, but a natural
law stating the limitations of the mathematicizing power of our species Homo sapiens.
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§2 Syntax Engine
¶1 · Syntax, as opposed to Semantics, is concerned with transformations of strings of
symbols, irrespective of the symbols meanings, but according to a precise and finite set
of well-defined rules. We call this set of rules algorithm.
¶2 · The previous definition of Syntax generalizes the linguistic one by Chomsky (1957):
“Syntax is the study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed
in particular languages” (page 11). A sentence is a string of words, and a word is a
particular case of symbol.
¶3 · We will assume here that persons, that is, the members of our own species Homo
sapiens , have a syntactic capability. If a person speaks a particular language, then she
has a syntactic capability according to the linguistic definition. Also, most of mathematics
is pure Syntax according to the general definition, see Hilbert (1922), and mathematics
are produced and consumed by persons.
¶4 · We will call whatever that implements a syntactic capability a syntax engine. So, if
persons have a syntactic capability, then each person has a syntax engine. In the case of
a general-purpose computer, the central processing unit (cpu) is its syntax engine.
§3 Finite Turing Machine
¶1 · A Turing machine can then be seen as a mathematical model for syntax engines, see
Chomsky (1959). The only part of a Turing machine that cannot be physically built is
its infinite tape. So we will define a finite Turing machine as a Turing machine with a
finite tape instead of the infinite tape. The tape is just read and write memory.
¶2 · For each finite Turing machine there is one corresponding Turing machine, which
is the Turing machine that is identical to the finite one, except for the tape. Defining
processor as the whole Turing machine except its tape, then any finite Turing machine
and its corresponding Turing machine have the same processor.
¶3 · If two or more finite Turing machines have the same corresponding Turing machine,
then we say that they are equivalent. Equivalent finite Turing machines only difference
is the length of their tapes; they have all the same processor.
¶4 · The processor has some finite memory itself to store what Turing (1936) called the
“m-configurations”. From the processor point of view, this m-configurations memory
is internal memory while the tape is external memory. Thus, basically, a processor is
a finite-state automaton, a Turing machine is a finite-state automaton attached to an
infinite external memory, and a finite Turing machine is a finite-state automaton attached
to a finite external memory.
¶5 · Because a universal Turing machine is a Turing machine, see Turing (1936), we can
define finite universal Turing machines the same way. A finite universal Turing machine
is a universal Turing machine, but with a finite tape, instead of the infinite tape. The
corresponding Turing machine of a finite universal Turing machine is a universal Turing
machine; both have the same processor. But, as noted below, a finite universal Turing
machine is not universal, because it is finite.
¶6 · With these definitions and considerations, we can say that the general-purpose com-
puter cpu is a finite universal Turing machine, by design.
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§4 Effective Computation
¶1 · We will call any computation done by a finite Turing machine in a finite time an
effective computation. Effective computations are physically achievable, because finite
Turing machines can be physically built, as the general-purpose computer cpu proves.
¶2 · Finite Turing machines will fail on those computations that require more tape than
they have available. Also, in practical terms, and particularly if the tape is long, time
available could be exhausted before reaching a tape end or a halt instruction, and then
the computation would have to be aborted, failing. These computations that fail in the
finite Turing machine because of a lack of tape (external memory) or a lack of time would
continue in its corresponding Turing machine, and they will eventually succeed, or not.
Summarizing: computing is more successful than effectively computing.
¶3 · But, how much successful? A computation is successful when the Turing machine has
reached a halt instruction in a finite time. And, whenever a computation has reached
a halt instruction in a finite time, the Turing machine has only had time to inspect a
finite number of tape cells. This means that any successful computation could be done
in some finite Turing machine in a finite time. So the answer is: not too much.
¶4 · In addition, each finite Turing machine computation that halts will be run identically
by its corresponding Turing machine, because no limitations of tape nor time were found,
and there are not any other differences between the two machines. So any computation
done by a finite Turing machine will be identically computed by its corresponding Turing
machine. Summarizing: an effective computation is a computation.
¶5 · A finite universal Turing machine is not a universal finite Turing machine, that is,
finite universal Turing machines are not universal, because, taking any finite universal
Turing machine, there will always be some computations that fail in it, but that do not
fail in other equivalent finite Turing machines that have more tape or more time.
¶6 · On the other hand, any finite universal Turing machine computation that halts
will be run identically by its corresponding Turing machine, which is a universal Turing
machine. And this means that, except for tape or time limitations, a finite universal
Turing machine computes exactly as its corresponding universal Turing machine.
§5 Calculability
¶1 · We will assume the following thesis:
⋄ Thesis 2 What is effectively calculable is what a person can calculate.
¶2 · This could be denied from a Platonist view of mathematics, because a super-person,
or a super-machine, provided with a syntax super-engine, could calculate what a plain
person cannot. But, firstly, we should say that this would be “super-calculable”, not just
“calculable”, and even less “effectively calculable”.
¶3 · And, secondly, if those super-calculations are outside our plain syntactic capabilities,
then we could never identify those super-calculations as calculations, nor we could follow
nor understand them. For seeing this, just imagine any finished calculation. If each and
every step of the calculation obeys the finite set of rules for the calculation, that is, if each
and every step obeys the algorithm, then we have a plain calculation that we can follow
and understand. Or else, the steps that do not obey the algorithm are errors, and then
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the calculation is wrong, even if its final result is right. So, for us, a super-calculation
can only be a plain calculation, or a wrong calculation.
¶4 · Another objection could be that different persons can have different calculating ca-
pabilities. This is true, but to investigate this issue, let us present our own thesis:
⋄ Thesis 3 Persons’ syntax engine is a finite universal Turing machine.
¶5 · If this is the case, then, for normal persons, that is, persons without mental disabili-
ties, the difference can only be the amount of memory or time.
§6 Proof
¶1 · We will now show that if thesis 3 is true, then Church’s thesis (thesis 1) is also true.
¶2 · First, using thesis 2 in §5, we replace ‘what is effectively calculable’ with ‘what a
person can calculate’. Second, using the concept of syntax engine, seen in §2, what a
person can calculate is what her syntax engine can compute. Now, if thesis 3 in §5 is true,
that is, if persons’ syntax engine is a finite universal Turing machine, then what a person’s
syntax engine can compute is what a finite universal Turing machine can compute. A
finite universal Turing machine is a finite Turing machine, as seen in §3, and anything
that a finite Turing machine can compute can also be computed by its corresponding
Turing machine, as shown in §4. To close this proof just remember the first definition in
§1: anything that a Turing machine can compute is computable. qed
§7 Discussion
¶1 · From the proof it is easy to see that it is also possible to imply Church’s thesis from
a weaker assumption:
⋄ Thesis 4 Persons’ syntax engine is a finite Turing machine.
¶2 · But this thesis 4 does not fit some empirical facts. Because, if thesis 4 were true,
but thesis 3 were false, then some computations would be outside the syntactic capa-
bility of persons. This would mean that persons could not follow some Turing machine
computations. In fact, we could only calculate one algorithm.
¶3 · On the other hand, the stronger thesis 3 implies thesis 4, and it is very close to the
converse of Church’s thesis. The converse of Church’s thesis would be:
⋄ Thesis 5 What is computable is effectively calculable.
¶4 · For this thesis 5 to be true, person’s syntax engine should have to be a universal Turing
machine, but then persons could calculate any computation, that is, any algorithm with
any data. Sadly, we persons are finite, and therefore neither our syntax engines have an
infinite memory, nor ourselves have an infinite time to do calculations.
¶5 · Luckily, if thesis 3 is true, and persons’ syntax engines are finite universal Turing
machines, then, except for limitations of memory or time, persons can calculate any
computation. So, taking a small enough part of any computation, persons can calculate
if it is computed rightly or wrongly.
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§8 Conclusions
¶1 · We can summarize thesis 2 and thesis 3 in a refined Church’s thesis:
⋄ Thesis 6 What is effectively calculable is effectively computable.
¶2 · Turing could not have designed his universal machine if his own syntax engine were
not a finite universal Turing machine.
¶3 · We have shown that if our calculating capability is that of a finite universal Turing
machine, then Church’s thesis is true. This way Post (1936) program is accomplished.
§9 Epilogue on Post (1936) Program
¶1 · Church (1937) reviewed Post (1936) program unfavorably. For Church, his thesis
gives a definition of effective calculability as computability that seems “to be an adequate
representation of the ordinary notion”, and that is all.
¶2 · But, even if that were the case, considering Church’s thesis a definition does not
settle the question, but just sweep it under the carpet. For suppose two possibilities:
A) Tomorrow someone devises a procedure to perform calculations that are beyond the
capability of any Turing machine. B) Tomorrow some machine is found that performs
calculations that are beyond the capability of any Turing machine. In either case, the
current definition would be wrong.
¶3 · So, it is not that effective calculability does not have an exact definition, and giving
it one solves the problem, as Church (1937) argues. What happens is that effective
calculability is uncertain because it depends on what we do not currently know.
¶4 · For Post (1936) program, effective calculability is defined exactly (by thesis 2, see §5),
and then Church’s thesis is not a definition, but a natural law that states a limitation
of the calculating capability of our species Homo sapiens (our thesis 3, see §5, for which
thesis 1, see §1, is a consequence, see §6). Therefore, Post law is our thesis 3 and, as any
natural law, it is refutable and then it is in need of continual verification. It is refutable
because it predicts both the impossibility of case A, and that we are blind to case B.
¶5 · As in our argument in favor of thesis 2, see §5, we are blind to case B if our calculating
capability is limited to computing, because then we cannot see the super-calculation
as a calculation. This is possibly the case of quantum systems. Take for example a
Schro¨dinger’s cat in its box. If we suppose that the box is a physical device that performs
a calculation the result of which is a dead or an alive cat, then we have to conclude that
no algorithm is obeyed, but that some random activity happens.
¶6 · Post (1936) program is deep. As he concludes: “Only so, [that is, only if Church’s
thesis is a natural law stating the limitations of the mathematicizing power of our species
Homo sapiens ], can Go¨del’s theorem concerning the incompleteness of symbolic logics
of a certain general type and Church’s results on the recursive unsolvability of certain
problems be transformed into conclusions concerning all symbolic logics and all methods
of solvability.”
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